Russian neighbor Georgia seeks to join European Union (complete interview)
By Lucas Anderson Matinho
(Guest columnist and economics/political science student at Trinity College in Hartford, CT)
TBILISI, GEORGIA – Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine last February, there has been a renewed desire for the expansion of Western organizations like the EU and NATO to encompass hopeful members which are also under threat from the belligerently bold regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. An ironic twist of fate for the Russian side, which has long decried the enlargement of NATO and the EU into countries which border Russia. Seeing the expansion of unfriendly Western institutions as a threat to their national security; using Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO and the EU as a casus belli for its invasion. Now that Russia has attempted to see its threat through, many countries view that the only way to preserve their own sovereignty is to swiftly join those Western institutions. Accession to NATO brings the promise of military protection, provided by the security pact’s hegemonic umbrella. Likewise, accession to the EU would entail a shift away from Russia’s economic sphere of influence and greater interdependence with the EU.
One hopeful EU member is Georgia, a small country in the Caucasus Mountains that lies just south of Russia. In 2008, Russia-backed separatist movements declared the independence of two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Shortly after, the Russian military began what was called a ‘peace enforcement operation’ to take out the whole of the Georgian government and secure the independence of these two breakaway regions. After less than two weeks of fighting, a ceasefire was negotiated, leaving the conflict “frozen,” with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remaining under de facto separatist and Russian military control but without Georgia relinquishing its claims to the territories. The Russian strategy of using separatist movements, often engineered by the Kremlin itself, then invading under the pretext of humanitarian concerns is one that was mirrored in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the so-called ‘special military operation’ into Ukraine in February 2022. Since 2008, Georgia has wrestled with polarizing internal debate over its relations with Russia and its potential accession to the EU. The country’s politics have been beset by Russian meddling and domestic actors with a personal stake in positive Georgia-Russian relations. Just two weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Georgia rushed to put forward its EU accession application only to be deferred by the European Commission until necessary governmental reforms are made.
In order to further understand the situation in Georgia and the country’s relationship with Russia, I sat down with Evija Kotan, the Deputy Head of the political section at the European Commission’s Delegation to Georgia, to discuss Russian influence, accession to the EU, and the future of Georgia. The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union and is the organization which vets the applications of potential EU member states for accession.
When asked about the current state of the government and opposition vis-à-vis depolarization, European Commission Ambassador Hartzell said, “I believe successful implementation of the 12 priorities needs to start and end with depolarization efforts. In the short term, it will be about reaching out and providing a platform and an agenda for the implementation of the necessary reforms.” Given that an overwhelming 83% of Georgians seem to support EU accession, what do you think is driving polarization in Georgia? Does the divide seem artificial?
The backbone of Georgian politics is the two-party system. The United National Movement initially grew out of the Georgian Dream party and are now in extreme competition to control the increasingly politicized media landscape and civil society. Georgian politics is driven by this party competition. The EU has been promoting election reform through the April 19th agreement; threshold voting would significantly reduce polarization by allowing smaller parties to have a voice in government.
What is the role of disinformation in Georgia, how easily can Georgians find accurate information about the current state of affairs? What is Russia’s role in propagating mis- and disinformation in Georgia?
Independent media is functionally non-existent in Georgia. Outspoken media is only borne out of political parties because the media environment is dominated by TV and large amounts of capital are needed to sustain TV operations. Written media is non-existent here and social media is directly related to whatever is on TV. Georgia is a very open information space, whatever is whispered goes directly into the TV media. TV travels much faster in Georgia than in more pluralistic countries. Media takes whatever comes in without screening sometimes. A lot of the issues are prone to disinformation especially regarding Russia and the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s role in Georgia is not well digested in the population. There exists a lot of unknowns and grievances that are prone to Russian disinformation campaigns. For Russia, it is very easy to send in a group to manifest and spread disinformation. There is a group in Georgia, likely backed by Russian intelligence, called AltInfo Group, which first appeared as a Facebook channel that combined racial issues and traditional, anti-liberal values in Georgia. An example of their work was during the July 5th pride events in which religious and traditionalist rhetoric from Orthodox priests was used to instigate beatings and other forms of physical violence, for which the perpetrators were not charged. This group was allowed to open a TV channel because there were no legal means to stop them from doing so. They have also established local political parties and set up 70 offices around the country, especially in locales with large minority populations. AltInfo has also launched information attacks against individual EU projects. They spread misinformation and manipulate issues in the Azeri inhabited regions about LGBT and traditional issues. There is no official proof of foreign funding. 26 representatives of AltInfo were arrested during the pride event this year but were released shortly after and received small fines for non-compliance. It’s pretty obvious that their funding comes from the ‘big guy.’
How is the European Commission helping to provide accurate information to the Georgian public?
Any project done has a component of communication and communicating larger European values and vision. The communication section at the delegation runs events and publishes material and campaigns for stratcom(strategic communications). We work with various thinktanks in the EU and Georgia to create counter-disinformation programs. There is a task force in Brussels whose mission is to develop strategies to counter disinformation and provide accurate political information. In terms of specific campaigns, people don’t really hear or find us outside of the capital, Tbilisi, face to face is better for the more rural areas. Our ambassador travels to each region and meets with representatives of civil societies; we are the face of the EU in Georgia.
Since the Georgian Dream party came to power in 2013, the government seems to have wanted to normalize relations with Russia while still maintaining EU accession ambitions.
Why isn’t there a greater willingness from the Georgian government to forgo a relationship with Russia for stronger ties with the EU and a better chance at accession?
Ask the head of the Georgian Dream party. We shouldn’t put that choice in front of the Georgian people: EU or Russia. That is exactly the kind of polarization that is occurring right now. Over their history, Russia was the problem of becoming more independent. Georgians see their independence as guaranteed if they become a part of the EU. They also want the jobs, dignity, and security that would come with being an EU member state. Georgians have tried to balance their close business ties with Russia and the former Soviet republics, which are more accessible and have less restrictions than the harder to access EU markets in terms of regulation and standardization.
The Georgian government has refused to levy sanctions on Russia in light of the war in Ukraine even though public condemnation for the war is quite high. What is driving this reluctance?
The biggest issue is many basic food items like wheat, milk, and other agricultural products are imported from Russia. However, Georgia is not so reliant on Russian energy, being about 60% self-sufficient and getting most of the remainder from Azerbaijan. It is possible that members of the Georgian government received strongly worded warnings at the beginning of the Ukraine invasion. In the beginning the government was more cautious with its rhetoric, but it is now more outspoken in its support for Ukraine. The government has tried to navigate their rhetoric toward support for Ukraine but there are still many questions about just how many connections they have with Russia, especially the secret services.
China has considerably expanded its financial presence in Georgia over the past decade. Does the EC have any concerns about China’s growing influence and the possibility of debt-trap politics being used against a potential EU member state?
That is not on any agenda here and it’s not really a question being asked at the political or economic level. Experts have said there is nothing to be concerned about. The EU is also financing part of the highway from Tbilisi to Batumi. There is no reporting on the issue here and, if there is, it is reported as an eager Chinese financial presence. The issue is not really relevant to EU accession.
How has the Ukraine war impacted Georgia’s EU accession process? Is there now more urgency for accession?
There is more urgency for possible Ukraine accession than for Georgia. However, it could never have happened as quickly as it did. Georgia had a great opportunity to get candidate status after the war started. Georgian politicians have been trying to push the idea that Georgia must be more active in supporting Ukraine in the war to have a better chance at EU membership. There have been indications of an eastern partnership over the last ten years, which have regressed the last year and a half before the war, but they have a great chance to gain candidate status. Both Moldova and Georgia grasped the opportunity to apply after the start of the war, but now it will not depend on the Ukrainian war. Georgia’s candidate status will depend only on sticking to the reforms that the EC has given them. Application only went more quickly because of the particular context of the war in Ukraine.
Having a pro-Putin state in the EU could considerably undermine faith in the EU and other western institutions. Are you concerned at all about rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding among EU countries, as recently seen in Poland and Hungary?
In Poland there was at some point great concern with anti-liberal policies, restrictions on individual freedoms, and legislative rights. However, the strength of civil society prevailed and authoritarian movements did not succeed. In Hungary, there was more nationalistic concern a couple of years ago when there was a need for specific action from the EU and the Orban administration couldn’t or refused to fulfill those actions, like during the refugee crisis.
And could the accession of an undemocratic Georgia give greater legitimacy or credence to these movements in other EU countries? For example, right wing parties in Western Europe and even North America have looked to Hungary’s Viktor Orban as an inspiration for the global illiberal traditionalist movement, a movement which the Russian government, under Putin, has sought to bolster through its influence over religious, cultural, and political institutions.
This is definitely one of Putin’s objectives to explore through these movements especially through the use of a traditionalist, anti-LGBTQ agenda. Putin seems to bet on the victory of these right-wing governments. One of his main objectives is the transformation of the current multilateral system to a more state to state or even person to person relationship with foreign governments. This is definitely a concern to us.
Do you think that increasing authoritarian rhetoric and skepticism regarding international institutions from the right wing in the United States emboldens the illiberal movement in Europe?
It has not left a trace but has left a boldness to movements that were already there when Trump was President. Especially the ‘post-truth’ philosophy that has spread across the world. In France, the yellow vest movement spread when Trump was President and spread to something it wouldn’t normally have turned into. We took notice to that during these movements. At one point, some of them had noble objectives but turned into anti-state movements. All in all, however, they did not turn into anti-EU movements. EU institutions feel much stronger than ever in some ways.
After speaking to some young Georgians, they expressed concerns over the recent influx of Russian migrants to Georgia, some worrying that a similar situation to the 2014 referendum in Crimea and subsequent annexation by Russia could occur here in Georgia. Is this a valid concern?
It is valid in a way because that is what he has been doing. But if you look at the Russians that have been coming in, they are not the same as those in Crimea in 2014, they are a generation that is more liberal and pro-business. They are different from the ones Putin would like to send. They try to speak English, learn Georgian, and are not as arrogant. There is a difference between tourists and emigrants: Georgia makes a lot of money on tourism but GDP numbers say nothing about the welfare of actual Georgians. For some, this tourism money is the only income they get in a year. Since the influx of rich Russians after the Ukraine war, Georgians have been kicked out of apartments, pay double the prices for items like real estate, food and transport and are very much feeling the short-term consequences of this large movement of people, which may stabilize in the long term.
Is the EC worried at all about the possibility of a nationalist, ethno-centric backlash against Russians moving to Georgia?
It was a concern a couple months ago when the first groups arrived. There were restaurants and taxis which refused to serve Russians. That has become less frequent because many of those that speak Russian are actually Ukrainians and Georgians would feel upset and serve them. Many of the Russians speak English, so many Georgians hear foreigners speak English and assume they are Russian. A lot of Russians that are still here want to travel on to the EU. However, it is difficult to get a Schengen visa for Russians right now. Overall, however increased immigration and tourism will be good for Georgia to have greater market dynamism.
What security concerns do you have for Georgia as related to the feasibility of NATO accession and the effects possible NATO accession would have on the EU accession process?
We try to separate those accession processes. Problems of NATO accession wouldn’t hinder accession to the EU. However, we do try to create links in areas like security cooperation. Whatever we do with Georgia defense or cyber related we work hand in hand with NATO. NATO has huge training capacity and experience that no other organization has and through that work we try to strengthen each process in a way. However, concerns over the rule of law are hindering Georgia’s chances for membership in both organizations.
